Incentive analysis: Casper FFG

Resources

Incentives in Ethereum's Hybrid Casper Protocol

Vitalik Buterin, Daniel Reijsbergen, Stefanos Leonardos, Georgios Piliouras

IEEE ICBC'19 Video

Assumptions

Adversary <49%

Full synchrony?

We assume a partially synchronous network, i.e., messages that do not arrive within the timespan of the intended epoch, are ignored

Liveness

https://gyazo.com/a2d26829431a0bc2db3e5fe8b5638460

Analysis with PRESTO Framework

Incentive Analysis of Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget as a PoW/PoS Hybrid Using PRESTO

Vitalik Buterin, Daniel Reijsbergen, Georgios Piliouras

Earlier draft by Vitalik and Reddit

Simulation, GitHub Repo

Background: PRESTO framework

Rethinking Blockchain Security: Position Paper

Vincent Chia, Pieter Hartel, Qingze Hum, Sebastian Ma, Georgios PiliourasDaniel Reijsbergen, Mark van Staalduinen, Pawel Szalachowski

https://gyazo.com/2fe69f8cf494c527303e758bcbb877a2

Stability: it is a Nash equilibrium for the validators to follow the protocol, and that selfish mining profitability is slightly reduced.

Efficiency: although the protocol may require large overhead, a dual-chain approach allows for optimisations that can ameliorate this.

Robustness: censoring attackers suffer at least one third of the damage done to their victims in the short term, and show that attacks only start to pay off after unrealistically long time periods, i.e., decades.

Persistence: the time to recover from majority attacks using the protocol’s minority forking mechanism can be bounded according to the protocol designers’ preferences (e.g., three weeks).

Others

One-message Casper FFG Incentives (2017.11)

#Economics #PoS